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THE PRAGMATIC REALISM OF JULIUS 
STONE 
Milton R. Konvitz* 
I. 
Quoting Machiavelli, Reinhold Niebuhr has said that the pur-
pose of the realist is "to follow the truth of the matter rather than 
the imagination of it; for many have pictures of republics and prin-
cipalities which have never been seen." The idealist, on the other 
hand, thinks of himself as one who is loyal to moral norms and 
ideals. 1 The idealist, said Niebuhr, may be defined as the person 
"who seeks to bring self-interest under the discipline of a more 
universal law and in harmony with a more universal good."2 Nie-
buhr refused to identify himself with either position unqualifiedly 
and exclusively. He saw the "relevance" of realism and at the same 
time the "relevance" of "an impossible ideal." On the one hand, he 
saw the central fact of power. "The historical realists know," he 
wrote-and he meant to include himself among them-"that his-
tory is not a simple rational process but a vital one. All human 
societies are organizations of diverse vitalities and interests. Some 
balance of power is the basis of whatever justice is achieved in 
human relations. Where the disproportion of power is too great and 
where an equilibrium of social forces is lacking, no mere rational or 
moral demands can achieve justice."3 On the other hand, he saw as 
universal the disposition "to hide self-interest behind the facade of 
pretended devotion to values, transcending self-interest .... " 
Man, he added, is a curious creature with so strong a sense of obliga-
tion to his fellows "that he cannot pursue his own interests without 
pretending to serve his fellow men. The definitions of 'realists' and 
'idealists' emphasize disposition, rather than doctrines .... "" 
If realism and impossible ideals are both relevant for judgment, 
if one sees all the ironies and ambiguities in the wills and actions of 
men and nations and yet refuses to accept the actual or historical 
as normative, how does one find an adequate rubric to do justice to 
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1. R. NIEBUHR, CHRISTIAN REALISM AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS 119-20 (1953). 
2. R. NIEBUHR, THE CHILDREN OF LIGHT AND THE CHILDREN OF DARKNESS 9-10 (1945). 
3. Niebuhr, Plans for World Reorganization, 2 CHRISTIANITY AND CRISIS 3 (Oct. 19, 1942). 
4. R. NIEBUHR, CHRISTIAN REALISM AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS 120 (1953). 
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such a dialectical position? It is a position which transcends the 
either/or law of contradiction. "The finest task of achieving justice," 
Niebuhr wrote, "will be done neither by the Utopians who dream 
dreams of perfect brotherhood nor yet by the cynics who believe that 
the self-interest of nations cannot be overcome. It must be done by 
the realists who understand that nations are selfish and will be so 
to the end of history, but that none of us, no matter how selfish we 
may be, can be only selfish. "5 
Here we see a realism that is without cynicism; a realism that 
incorporates into itself a realm of values, ideals and norms by which 
the past and present can be judged; a realism without illusions, yet 
with a sense of prophetic vision. "It is a terrible heresy to suggest 
that," wrote Niebuhr, "because the world is sinful, we have a right 
to construct a Machiavellian politics or a Darwinian sociology as 
normative .... "The historic, he went on to say, is not normative. 
"Man may be, as Thomas Hobbes observed, a wolf to his fellowman. 
But this is not his essential nature."8 
It is this Niebuhrian realism that, I believe, best defines the 
disposition of Julius Stone. One can see it in the philosophical un-
derpinnings of Law and Society (1948), 7 especially the second book, 
Law in Modern Democratic Society, which has been seminal in its 
influence on legal education, legal thought, legislation and judicial 
decisions. It can be seen in The Province and Function of Law 
(1946),8 in which he examined the nature and basic conceptions of 
law under three rubrics - "Law and Logic," "Law and Justice" and 
"Law and Society," a jurisprudential division and synthesis that 
has become well-nigh conventional. And it can be seen in his monu-
mental reworking of the field of jurisprudence in his more recent 
three volumes: Legal System and Lawyers' Reasoning (1964), 
Human Law and Human Justice (1965) and Social Dimensions of 
Law and Justice (1966)-which present his earlier scholarship and 
thought on a much wider canvas. These three books, together with 
the earlier work out of which they have developed, when seen as 
interlocking one with the other, present in a masterly fashion the 
dialectic interdependence and intertwining in the law, of logic, 
justice and society-the analytic separation and conceptual fusion 
of fact and value, of reality and ideal. 
5. N.Y. Times, June 2, 1971, at 1, col. 2, 45, col. 1. 
6. R. NIEBUHR, CHRISTIANITY AND POWER POLITICS 214-16 (1940). 
7. S. SIMPSON & J. STONE, CASES AND READINGS ON LAW AND SOCIETY (1948). 
8. J. STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW (1946). 
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The same Niebuhrian disposition of idealistic realism can also 
be seen in Stone's notable work in the field of international law, in 
Legal Controls of International Conflict (1954), Aggression and 
World Order (1958), International Court and World Crisis (1962) 
and Of Law and Nations: Between Power and Human Hopes (1974). 
Indeed, I believe that his basic disposition comes out best in 
some of his writings on international law, where he is at times com-
pelled to bring to bear on a specific question a combination of his 
insights and attitudes as a unified intellectual force. What can be 
philosophically or analytically broken down into separate considera-
tions of logic, justice and society needs to be somehow synthesized 
when a specific problem is under consideration and when a decision 
is to be reached. In his concern with contemporary challenges in 
international affairs, Stone knows that he is facing life and death 
issues. In such an exigency, the crucible of creation forces analysis 
into a secondary place, and the thinker's basic disposition comes to 
the fore, exposed and recognized for what it is. In his towering works 
on jurisprudence, Stone remembers the thousands of books and arti-
cles he has read-e.g., a single chapter, chosen at random, of Legal 
System and Lawyers' Reasoning contains 318 footnotes. But Stone's 
Quest for Survival: The Role of Law and Foreign Policy (1961) has 
only a single citation-and that, significantly, is of Niebuhr's The 
Structure of Nations and Empires. Quest for Survival is the text of 
lectures that Julius Stone delivered over the national radio network 
of the Australian Broadcasting Commission; it was not a work writ-
ten for scholars. In it, a famous scholar speaks responsibly to his 
fellow citizens who wanted to know what insights he could bring to 
bear on momentous questions that agitated them and the rest of 
humanity. This was no occasion when one might be tempted to 
substitute learning for wisdom, or analysis for concretion and in-
sight. He had to think as a philosopher but speak as one who had 
the right to decide and command. 
II. 
In the first several pages of Quest for Survival, Stone considers 
the question of whether or not the rule of law is operative between 
nations today, and what conditions would be essential for the estab-
lishment of its operation. 
Stone points out that in England-the cradle of the rule of law 
ideal-the rule of law is a protection against executive power, but 
"in the last resort" is no protection against the supreme power of 
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Parliament. Does the rule of law in England have, then, only a 
partial and narrow meaning and reach? In answering this question 
in the negative, as he does, Stone goes outside the realm of lawyers' 
law to society. He finds the essence of the rule of law "in the suprem-
acy of certain ethical convictions, certain rules of decency prevalent 
in the community, and in the psychological fact that those who are 
at the apex of power share those convictions and feel bound to 
conform to them. A duly enacted statute to liquidate H. M.'s Oppo-
sition would violate 'the rule of law,' not because it would not be 
lawyers' 'law,' but because it isn't Britishers' 'cricket.' " 9 The rule 
of law, then, is indeed a far-reaching ideal which does not rest exclu-
sively on lawyers' law but presupposes a certain moral climate in 
the community, of which the rulers are aware and which they share. 
For its operation, the rule of law has additional requirements 
that must be met: there must be a legislature that is "constantly 
overhauling the substantive law to keep it in tune with the demands 
of the time", and the legislature must be subject to the check of 
periodic elections and the check of publicity of its proceedings. 10 
The application of these propositions to international relations 
was easily made by Stone. Nations cannot be expected to submit 
themselves to the rule of law by allowing their disputes to be settled 
by binding decisions of an international court when legal rights are 
not subject to adjustment by laws which are themselves constantly 
reviewed and changed to reflect new conditions and new demands. 
How long would Englishmen or Americans venerate the ideal of the 
rule of law if the law by which they were ruled were, like that of the 
Medes and the Persians, one "which altereth not?"H The principle 
of the rule of law implies, then, the existence of a legislative power, 
which functions to make new laws to meet the evolving needs of the 
people-whether of a nation or of the international community. If, 
in the absence of such a legislative power, "we tried to clamp the 
'rule of law' on States . . . this would freeze vested rights as they 
now are, and make it even more difficult to adjust legal rights to 
rapidly changing conditions. There is obviously not the slightest 
hope that States will agree to this." 12 
But why is there no hope that States will agree to instituting a 
9. J. STONE, QUEST FOR SURVIVAL: THE ROLE OF LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 4 (1961) (herein-
after cited as QUEST FOR SURVIVAL). 
10. Id. 
11. Daniel 6: 12. 
12. QUEST FOR SURVIVAL, supra note 9, at 5. 
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program for changing the law and for enforcing it as it changes? 
"The feasibility of this in the international as in a national com-
munity turns," says Stone, "on whether the community as a whole 
... shares certain common ethical convictions as to the basic prin-
ciples of decency between man and man. But clearly in the relation 
of States such shared convictions are the exception. Indeed, some 
of the main war-provoking cleavages of today ... turn precisely on 
bitter divergencies of ethical convictions underlying the conflicts of 
interest. " 13 
Stone concludes this discussion with the judgment that propos-
als for the establishment of the rule of law among nations not only 
do no good, but can do harm. "For the illusory simplicity of the 
phrase 'rule of law' obscures the present handicaps of international 
law" as a basis for conflict management. And Stone follows this 
statement with a quotation from Reinhold Niebuhr: Men, wrote 
Niebuhr, are dangerous, not only "because they have ... unlimited 
yearning for power, but because they are creatures of dreams; and 
their extravagant dreams turn into nightmares if they seek to realize 
them in history." 14 
III. 
That this realism was not invoked only as an evasion of a com-
plex problem but reflects deep insights and convictions with respect 
to the nature of law and its functions, can be seen in Social Dimen-
sions of Law and Justice, published five years after Quest for 
Survival. Stone rejects the Austinian notion that power is the only 
component of law. In a democracy, the power-holders consider vital 
not only the element of coercion but also the people's sense of ethical 
obligation and conviction. The heart of the doctrine of the rule of 
law, says Stone, lies in the recognition by those in power "that their 
power is wielded and tolerated only subject to the restraints of 
shared socio-ethical convictions," and he notes that this ethical 
component, as distinct from mere legality, "seems sometimes to be 
regrettably lost from sight in the enthusiasms of 'world law' and 
'rule of law' campaigns." 15 
Quite a number of significant truths follow from the recognition 
of the ethical import of the rule of law notion, and Stone explicates 
them, but for our purposes we will select only several. First is that 
13. Id. 
14. Id. at 8-9, quoting R. NIEBUHR, THE STRUCTURE OF NATIONS AND EMPIRES 293 (1959). 
15. J. STONE, SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF LAW AND JUSTICE 619 (1966). 
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the rule of law cannot be indifferent to the substantive contents of 
law. It cannot operate on the basis of a maxim such as, "It is the 
law, right or wrong." Second, there must be in existence and func-
tioning a responsible legislature, which has respect for the dignity 
of all persons; for if the law is to rule, it must be a living law, 
reflecting and responding to the needs and pressures of living men 
and women - or nations, if we think of international law. "This 
substantive reference," says Stone, "imports both a minimal just-
ness of rules, and a dynamic responsiveness of substantive law to 
the needs of social and economic development."16 As if recalling 
what he had said years before in his radio lectures, Stone added that 
a vital insight from this analysis is: 
that mere conformity to law in the lawyer's sense is not sufficient 
for conformity to a meaningful ideal of 'the rule of law'. In merely 
the lawyer's sense it is not inconceivable that the unitary and su-
preme English Parliament might enact a law for the liquidation of 
opposition leaders. Such a law would obviously contradict an impor-
tant part of whatever we can mean by 'the rule of law'. 17 
Stone thus effectively shatters the coziness of the rule of law 
doctrine as a simplistic shibboleth by bringing a down-to-earth real-
ism to our understanding of the doctrine. But it is a realism that 
does not bring us to the edge of despair by a corroding cynicism. It 
is a realism that points to ideal elements which can be found in only 
a few parts of the world today. Yet they are sufficient to provide a 
standard for judgment within a nation and within the world com-
munity. For much of mankind, however, the rule of law is, and for 
the foreseeable future unfortunately will remain, an impossible yet 
relevant ideal. 
While its relevance will continue, the opinion may be offered 
that its impossibility has taken on aggravated force by the harm 
done to it by the United Nations and some of its agencies, especially 
in the last few years. When Florence Nightingale observed the de-
plorable conditions of hospitals, she is reported to have said that the 
least that one might expect from hospitals is that they would not 
spread disease. So one might say that the least we had a right to 
expect from the United Nations is that it would not spread injustice, 
inequality and disorder. There are more than enough of these in the 
world without the United Nations making it even worse. Yet what 
16. Id. at 620. 
17. Id. at 621. 
8
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 3, No. 1 [1975], Art. 7
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol3/iss1/7
1975] Pragmatic Realism 89 
a careful observer of the work of the United Nations has recently 
said about it is tragically true: 
In the United Nations, as in the League, a perfect paradox was 
created: an institution that would proclaim standards only to under-
mine them; that would profess beneficence while condoning - ac-
tively, or by silence, or through inconclusive debate - every form 
of barbarism. These apostasies were enclosed in an aura of right-
eousness in total contrast to the realities dictating them . . . .18 
There is less consensus on respect of basic ethical values in the world 
of the 1970's than there was when Julius Stone delivered the Austra-
lian Broadcasting Commission lectures in 1960. It is not simply that 
the world is divided into various camps, and that each side openly 
and honestly proclaims what it stands for, what it believes and what 
it demands, and there is no way of reconciling their differences. The 
trouble is that parties try to cover their real purposes by proclaiming 
principles and positions that they do not really believe. This vice 
was touched on by W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., Deputy Permanent 
United States Representative to the United Nations, when he de-
fined the United States' position as it abstained from the vote on 
the General Assembly resolution that expressed "deepest concern of 
reports of constant flagrant violations of basic human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in Chile." Ambassador Bennett said: 
I feel called on to make one more observation. We should not 
close our eyes to the fact that there is an element of hypocrisy 
involved in the discussions ... on human rights in Chile. What we 
have heard here in the last few days shows the existence of a double 
standard toward human rights and . . . democracy. 
We appreciate the genuine concern of most of the cosponsors of 
the resolutions before us. However, some of the cosponsors have 
denounced reported violations of human rights in Chile in the 
strongest terms while many of these same rights do not exist in their 
own countries. For example, do all of the cosponsors of the resolution 
allow members of the free press to circulate throughout their coun-: 
try and report without censorship? How many political dissidents, 
writers, or others who dare express themselves contrary to the offi-
cial line of their government wind up in jail, indeed suffer a worse 
fate? Even more elementary, how many of the cosponsors of this 
18. Hazzard, The United Nations: Where Governments Go To Church, 172 NEW 
REPUBLIC 11 (Mar. 1, 1975). See also s. HAZZARD, DEFEAT OF AN IDEAL (1973). 
19. U.S. Dept. of State, U.S. Positions at 29th U.N. General Assembly, Special Report 
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resolution allow free movement of their citizens into and out of their 
national territories? 19 
It is, of course, true that, as La Rochefoucauld observed three 
centuries ago, hypocrisy is the homage which vice renders to virtue. 
But La Rochefoucauld was a philosopher who allowed his realism 
to take him into the abyss of cynicism. Julius Stone, however, like 
Reinhold Niebuhr, has not allowed this to happen to himself. He, 
on the contrary, has the saving grace to live with the hope that the 
time will yet come when the hypocrites will live up to their hypocri-
sies. On the other hand, his strong sense of reality has kept Stone 
from the pitfall of cant. 
It may be that Stone shares with Herder the belief that hypoc-
risy in the international arena is itself a notable mark of progress, 
for until modern times nations, states and tribes went to war only 
because they hated their neighbors,. hated and feared strangers or 
coveted what their enemies possessed, and they made no effort to 
throw a veil over their base desires and ambitions. Herder noted 
that in modern Europe, governments at least made grand ethical 
professions and claims as they led their peoples into schemes of 
murder, robbery and plunder. "Gross infringements of international 
law," wrote Herder in 1774, "now are so much more publicly appar-
ent and have to be camouflaged by governments in terms of truth, 
justice and humanity-a thing which previously was both unheard 
of and uncalled for . . . "20 This discovery did not make Herder into 
a believer in inevitable progress. His name cannot be bracketed with 
those of Fontenelle, the Abbe de Saint-Pierre, and Condorcet, who 
believed in the inevitable march of humanity toward social perfec-
tion. Herder waivered, allowed himself ambiguities and compro-
mises, yet never hesitated to associate himself with struggles against 
ignorance, cruelty and prejudice. Had Herder known the maxim of 
Rabbi Tarphon, as quoted in the Mishnah, he would have been 
proud to have quoted and have adopted it-as has, indeed, been 
done by Julius Stone: 21 "It is not thy duty to complete the work, but 
neither art thou free to desist from it."22 
The philosophy of Julius Stone reflects the pragmatic spirit of 
No. 13, at 18 (1975). 
20. J.G. HERDER ON SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CULTURE 244 (F. Barnard ed. 1969). 
21. QUEST FOR SURVIVAL, supra note 9, at 81. 
22. 4 MISHNAYOTH-0RDER NEZIKIN, Tractate Ethics of the Fathers 2:16. 
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William James, who rejected both optimism and pessimism in favor 
of a belief in the mere possibility of amelioration. "We must learn," 
says Stone, "to bear . . . responsibilities, even as we learn to ac-
knowledge the finite limits of our capacity to meet them. The un-
avoidable frustrations of history must not weaken the search for 
feasible next steps, nor self-righteousness [to weaken] our will to 
understand and accommodate, nor dreams and yearnings [to 
weaken] our patience and will to wait. " 23 
23. QUEST FOR SURVIVAL, supra note 9, at 86. 
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